ABSTRACT

This study examined, “UN PEACEKEEPING IN AFRICA: EFFECTIVENESS AND PROBLEMS IN THE DR CONGO‘’; The study was guided by three research objectives: to investigate the reasons for UN ineffectiveness in DR Congo, to evaluate the Challenges faced by the UN Peace Keeping Mission and to examine the measures put in place by the UN  to promote peace keeping in Africa. The research objectives were later transformed into research questions. The study adopted the descriptive cross sectional research design. The sample sizes of the study consisted of online sources of data and a sample of 7 respondents. A closed and open-ended questionnaire was used for data collection. The data were analysed using thematic method of analysis. The collective action Theory was used to justify the study. The findings reveal the several factors such as Climate change have been a Challenge to the UN peace Keeping., and that measures are being put in such as deployment and the use if use to maintain peace and security in DR Congo by the U.N.

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to Study

The United Nations (UN) was established in 1945 with the core function of maintaining international peace and security (Hilmarsdóttir, 2012). The lessons learned after the first and second world wars made the world acknowledge the need to have a powerful international organization to check individual states. Ghoniem (2003) points that one of the main objectives of the UN is “to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security.” However, the UN is focused more on the prevention of war as opposed to resolving or restoring peace in areas experiencing conflicts (Hilmarsdóttir, 2012). Therefore, after the Second World War, the UN was involved in a few peacekeeping missions where the contributing nations had control of their military as opposed to the UN secretariat. According to Dobbins (2007), this was a risky approach to peacekeeping because the contributing countries could play partisan roles in the operations. More so, the UN was prone to facing the same challenges as the defunct League of Nations that failed to stop World War II. In 1956 the UN established its first fledge peacekeeping force to respond to the Suez crisis (Mehta, 2008).

The UN has had a military presence in DRC since 1960 the country has more than once formed the stage upon which new principles of international law and Security Council practice related to PKOs have first seen the light of day. MONUSCO is also the first UN force ever to explicitly have obtained a mandate from the SC authorising it to use offensive force against named groups, detached from the previous requirement of self-defense. Another interesting aspect is the SC’s declaration that the case is not to be seen as a precedent. Finally, there are also some interesting lines in the resolution declaring that the SC reaffirms the basic principles for peacekeeping – a statement not easily combined with the aggressive mandate lined out in the very same document.

Meanwhile, the force has in several ways been rather successful and efficient in executing its mandate in the field, something that suggests the concept is here to stay. The new legal issues rising from the MONUSCO case are therefore likely to remain relevant in relation to future peacekeeping operations, despite the SC’s reservations. Hopefully the thesis could shared some light on the most important legal issues associated with the SC’s going beyond the basic principles of peacekeeping, and also make contribution to the discussion on the legitimacy of these actions (Blokker and Schrijver, 2008).

Since 1996, conflict in eastern DRC has led to approximately six million deaths. The First Congo War (1996–1997) began in the wake of the 1994 Rwandan Genocide, during which ethnic Hutu extremists killed an estimated one million minority ethnic Tutsis and moderate Hutus in Rwanda (DRC’s neighbor to the east). During and following the genocide, nearly two million Hutu refugees crossed the Congolese border, mostly settling in refugee camps in the North Kivu and South Kivu provinces. A small subset of those Rwandans who entered DRC were Hutu extremists who began organizing militias within the Congo. Pressure intensified as Tutsi militias organized against the Hutu groups and as foreign powers began taking sides (Schrijver, 2008).

Following the Rwandan Patriotic Front’s (RPF) victory against the genocidal Rwandan government, the new Tutsi-led government began its involvement in DRC (then known as The Republic of Zaire). Rwandan troops, under the leadership of President Paul Kagame, and Congo-based Tutsi militias with Rwandan backing launched an invasion of Zaire, which was ruled at the time by Dictator Mobutu Sese Seko. Kigali justified both efforts by arguing that Hutu groups in eastern DRC were still a threat to their Tutsi population and that the Mobutu regime was harboring Hutu extremists who had fled across the border. Rwanda waged the First Congo War against Zaire with the help of other African states (most significantly Uganda, but also Angola and Burundi) who had their own security concerns related to Mobutu’s support of rebel groups across the continent. The Rwandan coalition’s invasion was coordinated with the help of Zaire’s then-opposition leader Laurent Kabila. Thousands died; some casualties were former Hutu militants and members of armed groups, but many were refugees and non-combatant Congolese in North and South Kivu, in eastern DRC. Methods of warfare were brutal, especially those employed by Rwandan soldiers and Tutsi groups. The Kabila-Kagame coalition won the First Congo War in 1997 when Mobutu fled Kinshasa. Kabila was installed as president of Zaire and changed the country’s name back to The Democratic Republic of Congo. 

In 1998, the Second Congo War broke out following the deterioration of relations between Kigali and Kinshasa. In an attempt to diminish the impression that Rwanda held undue influence over the Congolese government, Kabila denied claims that Rwanda had been responsible for winning the war and placing him in power. Kabila also began removing ethnic Tutsis from his government and took measures to weaken Rwanda’s military presence in eastern DRC. By the late 1990s, it was becoming clear to the world that targeted campaigns against Hutu populations during the First Congo War (mostly led by Kagame’s army) amounted to war crimes, a growing international consensus that reflected poorly on the fledgling Kabila regime.

In a reversal of alliances, Kabila ordered all foreign troops out of the Congo and allowed Hutu armed groups to organize at the border once again. Rwanda responded by invading in 1998. Kigali’s stated aim was to create a zone in the DRC-Rwanda borderlands controlled by its own troops in order to create more distance from Hutu groups in eastern DRC. Congolese forces supported by Angola (which also reversed alliances following the ascent of Laurent Kabila), Namibia, and Zimbabwe fought the Rwandan, Ugandan, and Burundi militaries, as well as various rebel groups supported by Kigali and Kampala. Amidst the chaos of war, Laurent Kabila was assassinated in a 2001 coup attempt planned by his own aides and guards. Those involved were imprisoned and Kabila’s son, Joseph Kabila, took power. The Second Congo War was formally brought to a close under the junior Kabila in 2002, and while estimates vary greatly, the death toll of the Second Congo War and the associated humanitarian disaster may have reached over three million people by 2004 (Blokkker, 2008).

 1.2 Statement of the Problem

The United Nations Organisation Stabilisation in the DR Congo (MONUSCO) have been present in DR Congo for more than 25 years today. Despites its attend to promote peace and security in the area, the security measures have failed due to the constants loss of lives in DR Congo. The eastern region of the DRC has faced security issues for over three decades. People are protesting for MONUSCO to leave because its strategy to maintain peace has failed. MONUSCO was deployed to restore peace in the DRC by protecting civilians, facilitating safe electoral processes and fighting rebel groups. But it has been in the country for close to 20 years and the opposite has happened: the number of armed groups has risen, people continue to live in unsafe conditions and innocent lives are being lost despite the presence of MONUSCO.

It was the peacekeeping mission’s job to prevent that happening, but it has not served us diligently and has proven to be useless. Right now, extremely high levels of violence are causing many people to migrate in search of safety. This alone is evidence enough that the peacekeeping mission has failed.

Many people in local communities do not have a good relationship with MONUSCO because they believe the mission has not taken up its role to protect them. Civilians’ lack of trust, in turn, makes it challenging for MONUSCO to carry out its mandate. But if it was effective, people would not be protesting against it

1.3 Research Question

1.3.1 Main Research Question

Why is there no peace in DRC despite the presence of the UN peace Keeping Mission?

1.3.2 Subsidiary Research Questions

• What are the reasons for the UN ineffectiveness in peacekeeping Missions in DR Congo?
• what are the challenges faced by the UN in promoting peacekeeping in DRC?
• What are measures put in place by the UN in promoting Peacekeeping in DR Congo?

1.4 Research Objectives

1.4.1 Main Research Objective

To examine the reasons for the absence of peace in DRC despite the presence of the UN peace Keeping Mission

• Specific Research Objective

• To examine the reasons for the UN ineffectiveness in peacekeeping Missions in DR Congo
• To evaluate the challenges faced by the UN in promoting peacekeeping in DRC
• To analyses the measures put in place by the UN in promoting Peacekeeping in DR Congo

1.5 Research Hypotheses

1.5.1General research Hypothesis

There is no peace in DRC despite the presence of the UN peace Keeping Mission

1.5.2 Specific Hypotheses

H₁: There are significant reasons for the UN ineffectiveness in peacekeeping Missions in DR Congo

H₂ To evaluate the challenges faced by the UN in promoting peacekeeping in DRC

H₃: Measures are put in place by the UN in promoting Peacekeeping in DR Congo

Objectives  of the Study

UN forces have been using force since the late 1950’s in different contexts and constellations and there has been a general acceptance for the institute of peacekeeping in state practice. However, peacekeepers’ right to use force has been under constant development, and the legal basis for this practice has often been far from clear due to the political character of the subject. As a result, although the core principles may be generally accepted in state practice, the boundaries delimiting the principles remain controversial.  

Special attention will be given to an analysis of the latest SC mandate in the Congo, constituting the first ‘aggressive’ mandate for a peacekeeping operation. As peacekeepers become combatants, the basic principles for peacekeeping – consent, impartiality and the limited use of force – no longer suffice to legitimise the operation. 

The purpose of this research is to share some light over recent development in SC practice in relation to PKO. The case MONUSCO is interesting for several reasons. First of all, the UN has had a military presence in DRC since 196011 and he country has more than once formed the stage upon which new principles of international law and Security Council practice related to PKOs have first seen the light of day.

MONUSCO is also the first UN force ever to explicitly have obtained a mandate from the SC authorising it to use offensive force against named groups, detached from the previous requirement of self-defence. Another interesting aspect is the SC’s declaration that the case is not to be seen as a precedent. Finally, there are also some interesting lines in the resolution declaring that the SC reaffirms the basic principles for peacekeeping – a statement not easily combined with the aggressive mandate lined out in the very same document.

Meanwhile, the force has in several ways been rather successful and efficient in executing its mandate in the field, something that suggests the concept is here to stay. The new legal issues rising from the MONUSCO case are therefore likely to remain relevant in relation to future peacekeeping operations, despite the SC’s reservations. Hopefully the thesis could shred some light on the most important legal issues associated with the SC’s going beyond the basic principles of peacekeeping, and also make contribution to the discussion on the legitimacy of these actions