ABSTRACT

The 1996 Constitution of Cameroon was designed to establish a decentralized system of governance that could cater to the needs of diverse communities. However, the nation is currently grappling with significant governance challenges that the Constitution has not effectively addressed. These challenges encompass issues rooted in the country’s historical background as a former dual-state colony, with particular emphasis on the Anglophone community’s sense of marginalization. In addition to these challenges, the Constitution has yet to adequately tackle concerns related to constitutionalism, the rights of minority groups such as women and indigenous peoples, the mitigation of interethnic conflicts, and the transition from authoritarian to democratic rule.

A thorough examination of the decentralization framework outlined in the 1996 Constitution reveals that the existing system has not satisfactorily resolved these issues from a legal and constitutional perspective. To establish a more efficient framework for administrative, political, and budgetary decentralization, there is a pressing need for a comprehensive constitutional revision. This revision should incorporate fundamental constitutional principles, such as the protection of human rights, the separation of powers, and judicial independence, to limit the ease with which the Constitution can be amended.

This study has determined that the implementation of legal safeguards, including the establishment of a constitutional court, is essential to prevent the central government from seizing and consolidating power. Only through measures like these can decentralization in Cameroon be promoted, enabling greater inclusivity, democratic development, economic growth, and conflict management.

Chapter One: General Introduction

The inclusion of decentralization provisions in African constitutions is often associated with Anglophone African countries like South Africa and Kenya. Nevertheless, this concept is gradually finding its place in Francophone constitutions as well, as seen in countries such as Cameroon and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The constitutional entrenchment of decentralization, particularly in the case of Cameroon, plays a crucial role in promoting peace-building and development efforts. To comprehend the current state of decentralization under Cameroon’s 1996 Constitution, it’s essential to explore its historical background, establishment, and evolution, which will be covered in greater detail in the subsequent section.

1.1. Background to the Study

The present-day Cameroon, along with parts of its neighboring regions, was shaped by the Berlin Conference of 1884 when it was declared a German colony known as “Kamerun.” This German colonial rule continued until a joint French and British military operation defeated the German forces in Cameroon in 1916 during World War I, subsequently dividing the territory into two parts. The French administered the larger portion, constituting about four-fifths of the land, while the British took control of two smaller, non-contiguous areas known as Southern and Northern Cameroon. This partition was later recognized by the League of Nations and, subsequently, the United Nations (UN).

The French managed their portion through direct rule, while the British incorporated their segments into their neighboring Nigerian colony. In 1961, a UN-conducted plebiscite led to Northern Cameroons choosing to join Nigeria and becoming part of the Federation of Nigeria. In contrast, Southern Cameroons voted to unite with the former French Cameroon, which had already gained independence as the Republic of Cameroon on January 1, 1960.

Following the plebiscite in Southern Cameroons, negotiations ensued between the Southern Cameroonian delegation and Ahmadou Ahidjo, the President of the Republic of Cameroon. This arrangement aimed to establish a loose and decentralized federation. The negotiating power of the Southern Cameroonians appeared weaker, leading President Ahidjo to make some concessions to their proposals through an amendment to the 1960 Constitution. The Federal Constitution of the Federal Republic of Cameroon, which emerged from these negotiations, was essentially an amendment to the Republic of Cameroon’s Constitution of March 4, 1960.

Reunification brought together individuals from different backgrounds inherited from English and French colonial legacies, creating a diverse population with over 250 ethnic groups speaking more than 270 languages. Managing this cultural, ethnic, and linguistic diversity, with its varying aspirations and interests, posed a significant challenge to the newly independent government. However, the Constitution was expected to provide a framework for promoting the rule of law, constitutionalism, good governance, democracy, ethnic harmony, and a resolution to the Anglophone issue.

Unfortunately, most research comparing the Cameroon Constitution to recently revised or new constitutions reveals that it primarily reinforces the principles of the original 1972 Constitution, along with several of its underlying values. Several factors contribute to this outcome:

1. The Constitution strengthened the highly centralized autocratic state system existing before 1996, with extensive presidential powers. This consolidation of power further diminished the limited authority of the legislative branch. The President is vested with the authority to appoint and dismiss the Prime Minister, cabinet members, generals, judges, provincial governors, prefects (Senior Divisional Officers), sub-prefects (Divisional Officers), and heads of parastatals at will. The President also holds veto power over newly passed laws, authorizes public expenditure, and can declare a state of emergency. While the Constitution introduced some innovations, many remain unimplemented. The establishment of a bicameral system, with the Senate as the upper house, is compromised by its subservience to the executive, limiting its influence on legislative content and initiation. Additionally, the Constitutional Council, which has exclusive jurisdiction over constitutional matters, only became operational in February 2018.

2. Regarding decentralization, while the Constitution maintains a centralized system, it includes provisions for the deconcentration of power through the creation of regional and local authorities. However, the vague language in the Constitution leaves the implementation of decentralization provisions entirely at the President’s discretion. The country is divided into ten regions, each led by appointed governors overseeing Senior Divisional Officers (SDOs) or prefects and Divisional Officers (DOs) or sub-prefects. Although the Constitution stipulates that regions should be governed by regional councils with authority over social, economic, and development issues, these councils have not yet been established. The President has the power to decide when and if regional and local authorities are instituted, define their powers, and abolish them as needed.

In summary, while the Constitution introduced certain changes, it predominantly reinforces the principles and structure of the original 1972 Constitution. This chapter sets the stage for a deeper exploration of these issues in the subsequent sections.