INTRODUCTION

The judiciary in Cameroon has long played a crucial role in ensuring the proper control of public finance. However, it is important to acknowledge that there are several shortcomings within this system that hinders its effectiveness and in the long run, addressing these issues is essential to strengthen the judiciary’s role in safeguarding public funds and promoting financial integrity. The arguments will thus be structured around both the drawbacks at the level of the Audit Bench of the Supreme Court (Chapter One and the drawbacks related to the Regional Audit Courts and the Penal judge (Chapter Two).

CHAPTER ONE: THE DRAWBACKS IN THE OFFICE OF THE AUDIT JUDGE IN THE AUDIT BENCH OF THE SUPREME COURT

The contribution of the audit office, although revalued, is not completely unacknowledged. This means that nothing would be more wrong than to consider the judicial control carried out by the auditor as limited. The interest of this part is to demonstrate that the auditor would contribute more to judicial review if the shortcomings he faces are averted. To this end, the study in this context will only attempt to externalize them. This chapter thereby looks into the internal limits to the office of the audit judge (Section One) and the external drawbacks to the office of the audit judge (Section Two).

SECTION ONE: THE INTERNAL LIMITS TO THE OFFICE OF THE JUDGE OF ACCOUNTS

The judge of accounts has received the mission to ensure the proper use of the funds of the State and other public persons^[1]. The mission is achieved through the controls it exercises over local accounting operations. Only, this mission is compromised because of the obstacles to said control. These hindrances here are qualified as internal. They are called internal, because they are directly linked to the office of the judge; that is to say, closely linked to the function of the accounts judge. They are then articulated around the shortcomings relating to the investigation procedure (I) on the one hand, and the limits relating to the judgment (II) on the other.

PARAGRAPH I: THE DEFICIENCY OF THE PRELIMINARY INQUIRY PROCESS

The procedure for examining local accounting operations is not exempt from any reproach, in view of the shortcomings linked both to its organization (A) and to its articulation (B)

1. THE ORGANIZATIONAL DEFICIENCY OF THE PROCESS OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION

The organization of the inquiry process consists in adjusting the skills of the participants and the rules which govern the said investigation procedure. To this end, the restriction of competences of the reporting judge and the relative authority of his decisions, constitute the main elements which feed the deficiency of the investigation on the plan of its organization. If it is true that the reporting judge has broad powers of investigation on documents and on the spot^[1], it is nonetheless true that the powers of the reporting judge are limited. This is the act of the legislator with regard to both the object of its control and its powers in the investigation procedure. The scope of the reporting judge’s control is limited to the management account produced by the local public accountant. The latter, although able to help him, does not carry out any checks on the accounts of the authorizing officers of the communities. Quite rightly, the reporting judge examines the accounts and ensures the existence and probative value of the supporting documents provided for by the regulations in force^[2].

No legislative provision mentions a possible control of the reporting judge on the authorizing officers except for cases of de facto management. As for the powers of the reporting judge, he does not have powers of coercion; he does not have the possibility of issuing rogatory letters, he does not have a power of referral of the training or the power of classification^[3]. To this end, he differs from the examining magistrate to quote Mr Christian MICHAUT^[4], in the sense that the reporting judge cannot compel the recalcitrant public accountant, nor force him to perform his obligations or an action that could constitute a catalyst for the control exercised by the reporting judge. For example, he can only send a request for additional information to the accountant^[5]. The reporting judge’s observations have relative authority. The investigation is sanctioned by a reasoned report on the accounts examined, which the reporting judge is required to present. This report contains separate observations intended for the president of the section who may, if he deems it appropriate, request an additional report produced by a counter-rapporteur. The recognized value of these observations is relative. The relativity results from the fact that these observations are subservient to a probable counter-report^[6] and subsequently submitted to the observations of the public prosecutor’s office^[7], which draws its conclusions from them before any transmission to the court formation. They are not directly imposed on the formation of judgment which can logically be influenced by the functional insufficiency of the instruction.

[1] SIETCHOUA DJUITCHOKO, ‘La reforme inachevee du controle juridictionnel des comptes aux Cameroun’, op. cit.

[2] Article 18 of law no 2006/017 of December 2006, op.cit.

[3] MICHAUT Christian, ‘Particularisme des procedures des juridictions financiere’, op. cit.

[4] Ibid

[5] Article 18 of law no 2006/017 of 29 december 2006, op. cit.

[6] Ibid, article 19

[7] Ibid, article 20

[1] SEGUIN P. ‘La cour, vigie des finances publiques’, op. cit.